BOOK REVIEWS
It's Your Law. By Charles P. Curtis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1954. Pp. 178. $3.75.
This is a book to read slowly, to buy and to reread at intervals.
It does not in my view do the particular job it was aimed at, to wit, that of
interpreting the institution of law to the intelligent layman., But then nobody
else has ever managed that, at least in English.2 What Curtis does instead is
to open up to lawyers their own work in law and with law. Curtis comes with
long experience but with gifts. He sees fresh. He tells without embarrassment
of what he sees: the bitter and the beautiful. He sucks his prose, as he has
long demonstrated, from a spring whose waters glisten. "Justice is a chilly
virtue." So the book begins.
"... The relations which a lawyer has with his client on the one hand and
'3
his court on the other are somewhat bigamous."
"... Our thinking is done on an alternating current, so to speak, from in'4
duction to deduction and reverse."
"A book of legal forms is the legal cousin of an anthology of popular
ballads." 5
As we are presented with the recited standard canons of interpretation:
"We are thrown into the same state of mild confusion as we are when the
waiter hands us the menu." 6
"Have you ever watched a lawyer drafting a legal document for you? Only
a good poet manipulates words at once more tenderly and more ruthlessly.... M
"Did the conduct of this person unduly stretch the tether of this word?" s
'That job is done better than anywhere else by the first chapter, "The Advocate"; but
"The Lawyer," once the point has been made that contracts govern parties and that good
drafting avoids litigation, becomes a chapter for lawyers on interpretation and drafting.
"The Trial Court," after an admirable introduction on the functions of the jury, moves
into an interesting discussion of the bearing of ethics and cultural anthropology on lawfrom which any thinking lawyer can profit and which I should like to review for twenty
pages. The last chapter, "Courts of Appeal," is a powerful and fascinating treatment of
the function of the Supreme Court of the United States, stimulating to the lawyer, accessible
to the non-lawyer-but only of that Court, and of that Court only on the constitutional

side.
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"It is as important that we be our own judge as it is important that we do
9
not act as our own attorney."
"My uncle used to say that the jury served the great purpose of ridding the
neighborhood of its sons of bitches.""' "Likewise a jury will often protect
virtue against the consequences of a stumble.""
"The Constitution is not really a single document, except typographically.
2
Different parts of it are addressed to different persons."
"The Bill of Rights tells us only what we can go to law for, not what we
can vote for."'13
"We too often forget that the reason for the great power of the Supreme
Court is not that it interprets the Constitution to us, but that it reads our
immanent patterns of behavior into our Constitution, and as it reads them into
4
it, the Court explains them to us, and so makes us the more aware of them."'
On the advocate's part in life, I have read nothing which packs as much
into as little space. Calamandrei is sophomoric in comparison. Curtis is dealing not with the techniques of persuasion but with their use: "The heart of
advocacy, as with other things of the spirit, lies in its ethics."' 5 One main insistence is that the advocate (and the negotiator is soundly seen as an advocate: spokesmanship is the basic pervading idea) must do dirt for his client
which he would not do for himself. Thus, when acting as a trustee, Curtis
took advantage of the statute of frauds in a fashion which was personally
abhorrent to him and which any decent commercial man knows to be immoral.
It was his duty, he thought. A later decision which makes the legal duty clear
gives him no moral comfort.
This type of relentless insight and refusal to fudge issues is a useful thing,
and rare. 16 Curtis goes on to wrestle with such other problems of divided
loyalty as that raised by court and client and that raised by absence of candor
in argument. He hugely oversimplifies. Some of the toughest divided loyalty
problems I know turn up, for instance, in a lawyer's relations to various conflicting aspects of his not really single government or corporate or partnership
client. But the way to get any such material out into the open for study is
Curtis' way: look at it clean and then say what you see, and recognize that
sometimes any choice may carry pitch-at which point "I do not know that
any set of rules ever has been, or ever can be, worked out for the successful
operation of a conscience."
9
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Contrast George Wharton Pepper, reviewing Curtis in 41 Va. L. Rev. 139 (1955), and,

proud Churchman though he is, resting smugly on the mere legal duty as if it were not outrage for law to force a trustee to undercut the very "morals of the market-place."
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On the old problem of believing in your case--"making it a cause"-our
author provides the usual wisdom based on an adversary system, and turns
then to some very nice quotations on Stoic philosophy to argue for some
detachment, which means some non-sinking of the advocate's whole self in the
case, as being one of the best assets any advocate can offer to a client. Yet he
recognizes that preparing and especially trying or arguing a case involve with
some regularity at least a temporary unnoticed pressure and suction into
Belief in Our Right. The whole is unresolved-as much so as in the quotation
from Brandeis' s in which that great man ducked the problem by talking as if
settling a case did not involve advocating it. Personally, I think much clarity
gained if we recognize that we have not only in the ethics of this matter but
also in the manner of handling the advocate's job, two recognized, legitimate,
and useful lines of feeling, action, and thought, which just happen to conflict
in many particular cases. I like to call them the romantic, in which the
spokesman merges himself in the cause, and the classic, in which he rides
above it, while yet serving it fully. The distinction would have gone far to
deepen and unify the first chapter of the book.
The second chapter contains an admirable discussion of theories of interpretation of statutes, with a thoroughly sound attack on the "intent of the
legislature at the time of passage" theory in either its unsophisticated form or
its "what they would have intended if this had been before them" revised
version; and manufactured "legislative history" comes in for due pillory. I do
feel that the author's emphasis on the text and the present problem, oriented
to what the legislature might be expected to do today, leaves two things inadequately dealt with. The first is the fact that no language of regulation
makes sense save in terms of some purpose to be achieved; a purpose not
commonly explicit on the face of a statute. The second is that a legitimate
distinction is to be drawn (though current theory is still slow to draw it) between what one may call a current statute, where conditions have not greatly
changed since enactment, and what one may call an aging statute, where the
relevant conditions have changed: compare, on many points, the Negotiable
Instruments Law.' 9
The chapter misleadingly labelled "The Trial Court" gives a superb summary of the jury's many functions, and a brisk suggestion of where it is at its
best. It brings back into attention Jerome Michael's magnificent emphasis on
At p. 25.
This chapter also soundly stresses the office lawyer's role as law-maker for particular
parties via documents. It suggests, though without full development, the greater structures
built by this coral-insect work. Compare Dubois, The English Business Company After the
Bubble Act 1720-1800 (1938) ; Hurst, The Growth of American Law, 301 ff., 342 ff. (1950) ;
Llewellyn, Bramble Bush 146 ff. (2d ed., 1951). The universality of the process appears in
the amazing story whose doctrinal results are reported in Wigmore, The Pledge Idea, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 321, 389 (1897); 11 Ibid. 18 (1897).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

the fact t it to get to the jury on any orthodox principles, the case must be
one which reason cannot alone decide. 20 It then by way of reaching for what
shapes the jury's behavior tours the relations of ethics to law and of the lessons of cultural anthropology to ethics: mostly solid stuff, and useful, sometimes striking. But that is my home bailiwick, where I am harder to please
than would warrant detailed justification.
The last chapter, on the Supreme Court's work re the Constitution is, as
one would expect from Curtis' prior writing, excellent. Something of tone and
substance is suggested in the quotes above.
Three brief criticisms: It would have been pleasant if the scattered and
sometimes warring remarks about "justice" had been brought together. I
noted some on pp. 1, 21, 63, 123, 126-7.
There is a recurrent tendency to "either-or" when the situation is really one
of more or less (what the author notes as "sub-contraries," the presence of
one of which does not exclude the presence of the other). Thus: "The administration of justice is no more designed to elicit the truth than the scientific
approach is designed to extract justice from the atom."121 All Curtis really
means is that the quest for some type of justice comes first, and that truth
22
must be content with the leavings. As a point of personal privilege, I note
that (as usual when positions are attributed to me) I was made to suffer under this. I am supposed to have pointed out that the fact that a lawyer's conclusions are given to him, with arguments to find, "requires lawyers to rely
23
solely upon the power of persuasion. No authority. Only persuasion." (Italics
added.) The author then quotes me in the text and shows by the quote that I
was talking about "the emphasis." I wish my other attributors of positions
which I do not hold would be that considerate.
The third criticism goes to the use of reference words. Curtis has an annoying habit of making a "he" or an "it" or a "them" jump back over a couple of
intervening nouns or even sentences, or of making the word shift base, e.g.:
"And the more the lawyer who drafts a document anticipates enforcement by
24
the law, the more he prevents it; and the more it takes the place of law."1
This irritates because Charlie Curtis can and does otherwise "make words
flow happily and freely."2 5
Such things are flyspecks on the essence, no more. The book as a whole
comes close to pure joy: pointed, powerful, welcome. Here is a true craftsman's ripe philosophy about a noble craft in many of its aspects: in the office,
at the bar, on the bench. The issues are a craftsman's issues; to explore them
'"P.103.
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'The only piece of verse quoted at length (p. 36) is mine. I also claim personal privilege
to describe it as very poor verse, indeed.
Cf. p. 46.
2'P.24.
" P. 43.
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helps a craftsman see and do his work, helps the job get done right. Consider
Curtis' picture of a document (or statute) as containing words which grant
to their addressee authority to apply in the emergent circumstance some
reasonable one of the necessarily multiple possibilities of meaning which lie
in the words. This is the rationale of the doctrine of a commercial agent's interpretation of his letter of authority, spread out shrewdly to illumine the
whole problem of construction of written language. Observe further how the
idea presses upon any court the true nature of its task: never to determine
"the" non-existent, single "true" meaning, in general; rarely indeed to determine even the best meaning; almost always, instead, to determine whether the
person addressed has chosen an interpretation which lies within the range of
the reasonable as applied to the matter in hand. This is sun burning off fog.
Or consider the further aid to sound drafting which is given by the picture of
arranging words for size and contour, according to need-with due stress on
the virtue of vagueness on occasion. 26 Indeed, throughout the book runs wisdom about words which is abreast of the best the semantics boys have been
doing, but which is put in simple home-like plirase.
The rich range of quotation is woven into the text with the effect of a
Persian rug-whether any strand be homemade or others-grown, it is the
strand needed for the pattern at the spot where it appears. And work from
medicine, from logic, from the modern philosophers of science joins with passages from Curtis' special favorites, Pascal 27 and Montaigne, to lend color
and perspective at the same time that they give bite and drive. For one aspect
of his profession and its work which Curtis understands, practices, communicates, is that when rightly handled our law-crafts belong also to the humanities. It is fitting that the book closes by quoting, admiring and correcting
Learned Hand's loveliest single writing, his speech on Liberty. There is an
error in that speech, and Curtis the craftsman cannot let it go by: even
though liberty lies in our hearts, it still needs Constitution, law and courts to
save it. Ideals, and even beautiful prose, have need for legal technique.
I repeat, a book to read slowly, word by word-one to buy and to reread
often.
K. N. LLEWELLYN*
Especially at pp. 7S-76.

Two points of difference on the literary side: In the fine passage from Pascal (pp. 9091), l'esprit de finesse is more effectively rendered "the spirit of art" than "the subtle mind";
l'esprit de gloniftrie is "the orderly mind," and when applied directly to the work of law
it is less "the legal mind" than the "legalistic" or (if that word tastes bad) the "rational"
portion of the legal mind. This may be a matter of opinion, but on pp. 79-80 there is a
plain blob. Curtis has no business to be misled by Empson into thinking that Ben Jonson's
song says the opposite of what it means. The key-word is "might." Turned into dusty
prose the lines say: "If I were offered Jove's nectar for thine, I wouldn't make the swap."
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

